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I. The Role of Foreign Investment
The major ideological differences over the real benefits of foreign in-
vestment, especially direct foreign investment I are widespread and deeply
rooted. Experience shows, however, that such investment, operating un-
der appropriate safeguards, can play an important role in accelerating
economic growth and development. 2 The recent decline of the overall
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I. Direct investment is defined in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAY-
MENTS MANUAL 408, at 136 (4th ed. 1977), as "investment that is made to acquire a lasting
interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of an investor, the investor's
purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise." In ORGA-
NIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DETAILED BENCHMARK DEF-
INITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 7 (1983), a foreign direct investor is defined as
an individual, an incorporated or unincorporated public or private enterprise, a govern-
ment, a group of related individuals, or a group of related incorporated and/or unincor-
porated enterprises which has a direct investment enterprise-that is, a subsidiary, as-
sociate or branch--operating in a country other than the country or countries of residence
of the direct investment investor or investors.
A direct investment enterprise is defined as
an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a single foreign investor (as defined
above) either: (a) controls 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of
an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise, unless it
can be established that this does not allow the investor an effective voice in the man-
agement of the enterprise; or (b) controls less than l0 percent (or none) of the ordinary
shares or voting power of the enterprise but has an effective voice in the management
of the enterprise.
2. For recent analysis on the role of foreign investment in developing countries, see
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volume of foreign investment in developing countries should therefore be
viewed with concern. After reaching a peak of U.S. $17.24 billion in 1981,
direct investment flows to developing countries have plummeted to U.S.
$11.86 billion in 1982 and to U.S. $7.80 billion in 1983. 3 Their slight
increase in subsequent years has not yet brought them to the low level
of 1982. They have also declined in importance relative to other external
sources of funds from 22 percent of total flows in the early 1970s to less
than 14 percent a decade later. 4 A number of interrelated factors in the
world economy and in host countries explain this phenomenon.
Worldwide economic problems resulting in decelerating growth rates
and sluggish demand levels continue to prevail. Meanwhile, the total debt
of developing countries exceeded U.S. $950 billion in 1985 and was es-
timated to reach one trillion U.S. dollars in 1986. 5 Worse still, due to the
excess of debt service payments over new loans and to large scale "capital
flight," international capital has begun to flow in a perverse direction,
from the indebted developing countries to the developed countries. 6 The
Greico, Foreign Investment and Development: Theories and Evidence, in INVESTING IN
DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLE FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL 35-60 (Moran ed. 1986). See generally
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33: FOREIGN PRIVATE IN-
VESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1985) [hereinafter OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33];
WORLD BANK, STAFF WORKING PAPERS NUMBER 348: PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1979) [hereinafter STAFF WORKING PAPERS No. 348];
UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND RELATED FLOWS (1985) [hereinafter UNCTC REPORT].
3. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION-1984 REVIEW 64, table IV-l (1984) [hereinafter OECD 1984 REVIEW]. OECD
figures include reinvestment of earnings of existing enterprises but do not include loans and
guarantees from parent to subsidiary.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT-GLOBAL TRENDS
AND THE U.S. ROLE 10 (1984) (22.1 percent in 1968-70 and 13.9 percent in 1978-80).
5. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES 1985-86, at xi, box 1 (1986).
6. The most recent WORLD DEBT TABLES reports that as a group, the 107 countries
reporting their debt through the World Bank debt reporting system paid U.S. $14 billion
more in long-term debt service than they received from disbursement of new long term
lending in 1984. Id. at x. For 1985 it is estimated that the negative "net transfer" from long-
term lending rose to U.S. $26.3 billion for these countries. As for capital flight, figures vary
according to the definition used. Based on bank depositing data, outflows of private capital,
defined as the change in deposits with foreign banks by nonbank residents, rose in developing
countries by almost $80 billion during 1980-86 to reach $185 billion at mid-1986, amounting
to 21 percent of these countries' total debt. Based on balance of payments data, cumulative
private capital outflows from capital importing developing countries during 1980-85 totaled
$135 billion, equivalent to 15 percent of their total external debt. Defined as a residual, by
subtracting from the increase in external debt the accumulation of foreign assets by the
domestic banking system and recorded current account deficits and adding to it net nondebt
creating flows such as direct investment, outflows of private capital by residents of devel-
oping countries in 1980-1985 may have amounted to $150 billion, equivalent to 17 percent
of total debt. While these estimates are not free from inaccuracies, they clearly show the
seriousness of the problem. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAP-
ITAL MARKETS-DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 69 (1986); see also Khan & UI Hague,
Capital Flight from Developing Countries, 24 FIN. & DEV. 2-5 (1987).
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combined effects of these unfavorable external conditions and of generally
unsuccessful domestic policies in many developing countries are devas-
tating. In several cases, they have set back the development process a
decade or more. Some of these countries are now experiencing declines
in real per capita output and consumption. Average per capita real incomes
in most of Latin America are no higher now than they were in the mid
1970s; in much of Africa, they are back to the level of 1970. 7
The long-term solution to these problems clearly lies in stimulating
growth and development, thereby enhancing the abilities of developing
countries to service existing debt obligations, restore their credit-
worthiness, and eventually increase the domestic consumption and living
standards of their people. Such solutions require basic changes in the
economic conditions inside and outside the developing countries and a
substantial increase in the financial flows they receive from abroad. There
has been, however, a net decline in such external flows in recent years.
After a rapid expansion during the 1970s, commercial bank lending to
heavily indebted countries has been greatly reduced since 1981 and is
projected to remain constrained in the near future. 8 Furthermore, official
development assistance (ODA) flows remain inadequate and are not ex-
pected to increase significantly. The ODA flows from the member coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) are at best expected to grow at an annual rate in the order of
two percent 9 while similar flows from the members of the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have already declined
sharply. 10 Persisting internal economic problems and the need to use a
significant proportion of domestic savings to service foreign debt have
also left few domestic resources to finance the local cost of development
projects. The capital required to inject momentum back into the devel-
opment process is thus huge, but far from being readily available.
The economic problems of developing countries have been further ex-
acerbated by a number of other factors. Slower rates of growth and de-
mand in industrialized countries and their protectionist policies have
7. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985, at 1 (1985) [hereinafter WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985].
8. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33, supra note 2, at 2.
9. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 103 (1985).
10. From $5.4 billion in 1983-84 to $4.5 billion in 1984-85. In real terms, this represents
a decline by an average of 15.4 percent from 1980-84. In 1980, OPEC net disbursements
accounted for 24 percent of total ODA; in 1984, only 13 percent. See Shihata & Sherbiny,
The OPEC Aid Phenomenon in Perspective, IX OPEC REV. 323, 329-35 (1985); Shihata &
Sherbiny, A Review of OPEC Aid Efforts: Twenty-Five Years of Bilateral and Multilateral
Aid from Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 23 FIN. & DEV.
17 (1986).
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adversely affected prospects for export-oriented investments in devel-
oping countries.lI Depressed domestic economic conditions and stagnat-
ing demand in these latter countries have made investment for import-
substitution less attractive. Interest rates on borrowed funds also reached
record levels, at times causing parent companies in developed countries
to borrow from their subsidiaries abroad, rather than to provide financing
to them. And a marked drop in commodity prices has drastically reduced
both the export earnings of many developing countries and the attrac-
tiveness of investment in their extractive sectors, which used to account
for a large portion of overall foreign investment. In these circumstances,
uncertainties, real or perceived, about the transfer of returns on invest-
ments and the stability of contractual arrangements of foreign investors
with host governments have increased substantially. Meanwhile, longer
term forces such as the decreasing share of labor in production cost in
industrial countries and the increasing conservation and reliance on sub-
stitutes to primary commodities are gradually depriving developing coun-
tries of the comparative advantages of low-cost labor and abundant raw
materials.
Developing countries are thus seemingly trapped in a vicious circle.
The balance of payments difficulties of the heavily indebted countries
have practically cut many of them off from borrowing "new money" on
the international capital market or from attracting the large volume of
foreign investment needed to expand their productive facilities. Many
other developing countries that managed not to accumulate large debts
are equally unable to attract greater external flows due to stagnation in
ODA flows and the perceived negative aspects of their investment climate.
The majority of these countries also suffer from a continuing decline of
their earned foreign exchange.
In fact, this difficult and vicious circle can be broken. The IMF and
the World Bank are intensifying their efforts to help the heavily indebted
countries restore their creditworthiness and regain their attractiveness to
commercial lenders. Major industrial countries are at long last taking
initiatives to encourage both commercial banks and international financial
institutions to increase their exposure in developing countries. It is also
increasingly recognized that foreign direct investment could be an im-
portant component in an effective strategy to develop global solutions to
the world debt crisis. Foreign direct investment has considerable potential
for promoting sustained growth and employment and reducing vulnera-
bility to future deterioration in economic conditions. 12 It increases the
11. See Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Press Communique (April 11, 1986).
12. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33, supra note 2, at 1-2.
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flows of nondebt creating equity to developing countries, and compensates
to some extent for the drying up of international bank lending.
This is not to suggest, however, that foreign direct investment does not
have an economic and social cost. Nor does it suggest that it can be a
substitute for other types of capital inflows. To represent net gains to host
countries, investment must always operate within appropriate safeguards
that would ensure their economic soundness, their contribution to de-
velopment, and their compliance with the laws of the host country. Ex-
pansion of such investment does not negate the need for further expansion
of other forms of financial inflows. Higher levels of commercial lending
should still be reached with greater concern as to the end use of funds.
And the highly concessional ODA flows are not easily substitutable, es-
pecially in low-income countries. Given the fact that foreign direct in-
vestment has been highly concentrated in higher income countries and
that its growth cannot realistically take the same rate experienced by
external commercial lending in the 1970s, it should always be conceived
as a complementary source of finance for developing countries, which
need to undergo substantial developments in size, geographic direction,
and sectoral composition if such investment is to play a substantial role
in the growth of developing countries as a whole.
It should be noted in this context that foreign direct investment has a
considerable advantage over external borrowing due to a number of fac-
tors. First, direct investment does not simply provide funds, but an in-
tegrated package of financial resources, managerial skills, technical
knowledge, and marketing connections. Second, it is not a debt creating
instrument. The investor bears the risks of project failure, while a lender
has the right to be repaid regardless of how effectively the borrowed funds
were used. Third, other indirect but important attributes of this form of
capital relate to benefits that ensue from the introduction of efficient and
internationally competitive enterprises into the local economy. In the long
run, direct foreign investment can foster a general improvement in
production by stimulating the adoption of improved techniques and man-
agement in other sectors of the economy, and among local entrepreneurs.
Fourth, foreign investment often works as a catalyst for associated lending
for specific projects, thus increasing the overall availability of external
resources for productive purposes. Also, foreign investors often act as
lobbyists in their home countries for the benefit of their projects in de-
veloping countries.
Foreign portfolio investment in the securities markets of developing
countries, although relatively limited to date, could also become an im-
portant complementary source of nondebt creating equity finance in several
developing countries. The total investable funds of institutional investors
in the industrialized countries is estimated at over U.S. $2 trillion, and
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growing at about 15 percent annually in nominal terms. 13 For the devel-
oping countries with emerging capital markets, this represents a vast
potential source of capital inflow without the usual concerns about man-
agerial control inherent in direct investment. Even a small shift of these
funds towards these emerging markets could represent an important ad-
dition to the volume of capital flows to developing countries. Domestic
financial systems may also be strengthened through portfolio investment,
which can bolster the capital bases and alleviate the high corporate
debt:equity ratios found in many developing countries. For the investor,
portfolio investment in the emerging markets would allow risk diversifi-
cation and the possibility of generally higher returns. The total annual
return in U.S. dollars for such emerging markets (excluding Hong Kong
and Singapore) in recent years has been estimated to average approxi-
mately 15 percent in comparison to 12 percent for the rest of the world's
equity markets. 14
Many developing countries now recognize the advantages inherent in
foreign investment, in both its direct and portfolio forms, and its vital
role in their future development, particularly in view of the decline in
other external sources of funds. This has necessitated a fundamental change
of attitude from the previous two decades, which were characterized by
increasingly restrictive investment environments reflecting nationalistic
sentiments, the availability of alternative bank lending and negative per-
ceptions about earlier experiences with foreign investment. Foreign inves-
tors were typically accused of adopting practices unfavorable to the
economies of their host countries. The long list of accusations, which
were often based on a mixture of hostile ideologies and actual experiences,
included the adoption of inappropriate productive technologies and cen-
tralized management, the crowding out of potential domestic borrowers
by raising a good part of capital requirements locally, and the use of
transfer prices, royalty and interest payments, and other means to avoid
host country limits on profit remittances and foreign exchange regulations,
circumvent price controls, and escape taxes. 15 Today, however, devel-
13. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (IFC) CAPITAL MARKETS DEPARTMENT,
THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT AS A SOURCE OF DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE (1985) [hereinafter FOREIGN INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO]; see also WORLD BANK,
STAFF WORKING PAPERS No. 784: CAPITAL MARKET INNOVATIONS AND FINANICAL FLOWS
To DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1985).
14. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985, supra note 7, ch. 9, table 9.2; A. VAN
AGTMAEL, EMERGING SECURITIES MARKETS-INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
35-36 (1984).
15. See generally WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985, stupra note 7, ch. 9: R. BARNET
& R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 123-
84 (1974); R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL ISSUES 139-73 (1977);
see also J. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
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oping countries have come to realize that there is scope for a more bal-
anced situation. They are gaining increased confidence in their ability to
create a receptive and liberal investment environment that recognizes the
legitimate interests of foreign investors while maintaining adequate poli-
cies and procedures to ensure the soundness of the investments involved.
As a result, a great number of developing countries are now competing
to promote foreign investment and to restore the confidence of foreign
investors, which had been impaired by the wave of expropriations and
other discriminatory actions in the 1960s and the early 1970s and by the
growing difficulties in the convertibility and transfer of income.
In spite of this change of attitudes, developing countries are faced with
the grim reality of declining foreign investment flows. Until 1981 the real
value of annual investment flows hardly changed over fifteen years, while
other sources, especially commercial loans, were increasing rapidly. Even
the nominal value of investment flows, which was increasing until that
year, has drastically dropped ever since. 16 Of all foreign direct investment
worldwide, developing countries receive only about one-fourth. Of this,
the bulk has gone mainly to a few higher-income countries in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia, with Brazil and Mexico accounting for a large (almost 30
percent) though declining share. 17
As mentioned earlier, the general decline in the flows of foreign in-
vestment to developing countries has resulted from both global economic
conditions and changes in the investment climate, as well as from policies
prevailing in the developing countries themselves. In particular, percep-
357-84 (1981); S. LALL, Transnaionals and the Third World, in MULTINATIONALS, TECH-
NOLOGY AND EXPORTS--SELECTED PAPERS 66-81 (1980); L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL
COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1973); R. VERNON. SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE. REALITIES: MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES RESPOND ON BASIC ISSUES (1974); DE-
PARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS. MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, UN Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973). For a recent sur-
vey. see ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, UNITED NATIONS, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
RELATED TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS, UN Doc. E/C.10/1986/2 (1986).
16. For the figures on foreign direct investment flows and bank loans to developing
countries in constant 1982 prices and exchange rates from 1970 through 1983. see OECD
1984 REVIEW. supra note 3, at 65.
17. According to figures reported by the IMF, the share of Brazil and Mexico in total
foreign direct investment flows to developing countries, which reached some 40 percent in
earlier years, averaged about 29.2 percent during 1980-1983, and the share of Singapore in
foreign direct investment flows to Asia averaged about 38.8 percent during 1980-1983. IN-
TERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS 1984. at 76-77 (1984)
[hereinafter BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS 1984]; see also World Development Report
1985, supra note 7, ch. 9; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19-24 (5th ed. 1983). Since OECD and IMF
use different data bases, the figures reported by them are not completely consistent.
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tions of unfavorable climates and volatile economic policies have
discouraged investors from seeking projects in developing countries.
Investors' behavior shows a consistent preference for "safer" invest-
ments even when they are commercially less attractive. Their reluctance
to invest larger volumes in developing countries in recent years is not
simply a result of a dearth of investment opportunities.
It is generally recognized that, on average, capital invested in devel-
oping countries is likely to yield a higher economic, social and, at times,
financial return than that invested in industrialized countries. This is in
fact a logical result of a greater scarcity of capital in developing coun-
tries. 18 It also indicates that the growth of foreign investment flows may
be expected to resume in the future, particularly in the more rapidly
growing economies such as those of South East Asia. 19 However, recent
experience suggests that this is far from being a foregone conclusion.
Untapped investment opportunities in developing countries could cer-
tainly attract external funds to exploit them. But fundamental changes in
the economic policies of both the governments of capital-exporting and
capital-importing countries would be required if drastic changes in- the
investment flows are to take place. In addition, perceptions of foreign
investors about the noncommercial risks they are likely to face in devel-
oping countries have to be dramatically dissipated before substantial in-
creases in the volume of foreign investment flowing to these countries
can materialize.
II. The Investment Climate
An attractive investment opportunity and an acceptable investment
climate represent the optimal mix of high financial returns and low non-
commercial risks. Improving the investment climate, and, in particular,
reducing perceptions of political risk in developing countries, are therefore
important steps without which even the most profitable opportunities are
likely to remain untapped.
18. During 1970-1982, the "incremental capital output ratio" (ICOR), measuring the amount
of investment capital needed to produce one unit of extra Gross Domestic Product, was
roughly 7:1 in developed countries and some 5:1 in developing countries. Even though a
portion of the differential in return rates has to be discounted to offset the perception of
risk that is attached to investments in developing countries, the risk-adjusted return is large
enough to justify, in theory, preference for investment in developing countries. See WORI-O
DEVELOPMENT REPORT. stpra note 7, table 9.2: A. VAN AGTMEL., supra note 14.
19. UNCTC REPORT, sutpra note 2, at 29. The report states that "since rates of return
in Latin America may be slow in recovering, it is possible that the recent trend towards
greater concentration of investment in the rapidly growing economies of South East Asia
will continue in the near future."
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The investment climate should be seen in this context from both a global
and domestic perspective. Overall volumes of investment flows and host
countries' efforts to increase such flows are constrained or stimulated by
the degree of strength and stability of the world economy. A faster and
sustainable growth in developing countries depends to a great extent on
the policies and actions of industrial countries, especially the latter's own
growth rates, the levels they adopt for interest and exchange rates, the
degree of openness of their markets and the levels of their external aid
flows. However, within this framework much can be done to improve
current conditions on the domestic scene of developing countries as well.
The domestic investment climate is a multifaceted, dynamic concept.
In its broad sense, it comprises many interrelated elements that can be
presented in three categories: (a) institutional, including policy aspects;
(b) infrastructural aspects; and (c) legal aspects.
A. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY ASPECTS
Institutional aspects of the investment climate particularly cover the
political stability of the government of the host country, its economic
policies (especially policies and behavior toward private investment, both
domestic and foreign), the degree of sophistication of its financial and
administrative institutions, as well as the administrative procedures for
initiating and operating investments in the country.
The policy toward foreign investment will, to some degree, depend on
the ideological orientation of the host government. However, this need
not be a market philosophy. For example, centrally planned economies
are increasingly encouraging foreign investment by providing stable and
well-defined conditions. Governments which enjoy political and social
stability, and have established institutions to ensure continuity and smooth
transitions without the pains of abrupt or violent changes, greatly con-
tribute to the evolution of an attractive investment environment. The
prevailing cultural environment may also be important in shaping business
customs and attitudes toward foreign investment.
Under a policy of encouraging foreign investment, pronouncements that
emphasize the government commitment to a fair and stable treatment of
such investment are important in reassuring investors that they are wel-
comed by the host country. Predictability and perseverance in the imple-
mentation of these policies are essential in establishing credibility and in
dissipating negative perceptions. The applicable rules need to be estab-
lished in advance in a nondiscriminatory and unambiguous way. 20 Pro-
motional efforts may also make an important contribution to the amount
20. STAFF WORKING PAPERS No. 348, supra note 2, at 21.
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of investment received. In view of the fact that investment decisions are
made on the basis of known alternatives, the greater the supply of infor-
mation about investment opportunities, the more the likelihood of at-
tracting potential investors and dispelling perceptions of risk that emanate
from uncertainty and ignorance. Accurate and up-to-date information on
investment opportunities, as well as data on general economic trends,
trade flows, and domestic market and consumption patterns, are of great
relevance to any prudent investor. Clearly defined development programs
that elaborate priorities and identify sectoral opportunities are also useful.
The more sophisticated promotional agencies may provide assistance with
preinvestment studies and certain aspects of implementation and man-
aging of projects.
A favorable economic condition in the host country is one of the most
important variables influencing the flow of foreign investment. Govern-
ments can significantly improve their investment climate by the adoption
of macroeconomic policies to ensure proper economic planning and ef-
ficient utilization of resources. The stage of economic development of the
host country, as well as good economic performance, are the major de-
terminants of business opportunities, and explain resultant investment
flows and their concentrations at present in relatively few developing
countries. For example, countries with large domestic markets and de-
mand can be attractive for import-substitution investments. While coun-
tries with low levels of income and small domestic markets receive little
investment of this kind, they may still be attractive to foreign investors
as locations for export-oriented production.
The pursuit of appropriate financial and exchange rate policies are of
great importance. The current foreign exchange constraints of many in-
debted developing countries may impair confidence in the long-term vi-
ability of investments in their territories and the possible risk regarding
future repatriations of profits. The currency transfer risk is of particular
concern for investments that do not generate foreign exchange directly
through payments for exports. Liberal trade policies of both home and
host countries are also critical in determining export-oriented invest-
ments. Other elements of the institutional aspects of a good investment
environment that have to be considered include: appropriate market-
determined pricing; labor policies and laws to reduce distortions and rig-
idities in the labor market; reasonable taxation levels to encourage in-
vestment; and the development of financial markets. 2'
21. The foregoing discussion on general economic aspects of the investment climate is
largely based on an internal study prepared in 1985 by the World Bank. See INDUSTRY
DEPARTMENT, WORLD BANK, BANK GROUP ROLE IN FOSTERING ENTERPRISE DEVELOP-
MENT (1985) 1hereinafter BANK GROUP ROLE].
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Within the framework of general economic policies conducive to overall
greater volumes of foreign investment, specific policies designed to en-
hance revenues or reduce the costs to foreign investors may be adopted,
and can be used to channel flows into priority sectors or to influence the
choice of location. However, the importance of such incentives should
not be overstated. In the absence of an overall attractive climate, such
incentives are not likely to be effective; where such climate is adequately
attractive, they may in fact represent an unjustified sacrifice by the host
country. Furthermore, it has been found that "in many cases, the incen-
tives offered by a country, when taken together, are inconsistent, contra-
dictory or redundant." 22 A recent study by the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) on the effects of incentives and regulations concluded
that the investor's choice of country could sometimes be influenced by
the host country's incentive policy.23 Other research on the subject seems
to suggest that the impact of incentives is probably marginal. 24 Incentives
are more likely to influence intraregional location decisions, or decisions
regarding the location within a specific country, its timing, size, and form,
more than overall volumes of investment that are determined by the broader
investment climate of the host country. 25 However, it has been noted that
"incentives matter in the sense that an individual country might stand to
lose much direct investment were it to abolish all of its incentives
unilaterally." 26
The effectiveness of incentives policies is often reduced by the con-
fusion created by their great variety and the existence of restrictions that
may minimize the net benefits. The greater the complexity, and the more
22. WORLD BANK, STAFF WORKING PAPERS No. 669: INVESTMENT INCENTIVES FOR
INDUSTRY i (1984) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS No. 669].
23. S. GUISINGER, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY FOREIGN INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES (1983). In two-thirds of seventy-four cases surveyed in four industries (petro-
chemical, automobile, computer, and food processing), the study found that the choice of
country was influenced by host government incentives policies. Effectiveness of the incen-
tives was "determined by comparing a country's attractiveness to investors under current
incentive (and disincentive) policies with hypothetical conditions that would prevail if a
country removed all incentives and disincentives while all other competitor countries main-
tained incentives policies as before. Id. at v. See also Guisinger, Host Country Policies to
Attract and Control Foreign Investment, in INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR
PRIVATE CAPITAL 157-72 (Moran ed. 1986).
24. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1983); STAFF WORKING
PAPERS No. 669, supra note 22; OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33, supra note 2, at 16-17; WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985, supra note 7, at 130.
25. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 49 (1983); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROCESS (1983).
26. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33, supra note 2, at 17.
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often such policies change, the greater the degree of uncertainty intro-
duced into the investment decision. Moreover, the stringent requirements
and cumbersome and lengthy administrative procedures for obtaining the
incentives can be a major deterrent for foreign investment. 27 Such policies
also result in an administrative burden for the host country, which has to
use additional skilled manpower for the approval, implementation, and
monitoring of the policies, but without which benefits to the economy
might further be reduced. This problem is exacerbated where there is no
central and efficient agency to carry out and coordinate all investment-
related policies and the investor has to battle with various agencies with
conflicting competencies and interests.
A government may also introduce regulations restricting foreign in-
vestment in certain sectors to ensure its conformity with developmental
priorities. Entry into politically sensitive industries, like public utilities,
the media, banking, and insurance, has been restricted in most developing
countries. Industries with relatively simple technology or financial
requirements have also been reserved for local enterprises. 28 Other re-
strictions may relate to the degree of foreign ownership and control in
enterprises, access to local capital markets, and remittances of profits.
Specific performance requirements on foreign investors are common. Many
of these regulations may prove in the long run to be very costly to the
economy of the host country although some of them are no doubt justified,
for example, on account of industrial security and protection of the en-
vironment. The extent of the limitations imposed is likely, therefore, to
be the determining factor. The abovementioned IFC study found, with
respect to restrictions, that companies tended to take such requirements
into consideration in their investment decisions. 29 The present trend to-
ward a more liberal regulatory framework in developing countries should
therefore help their efforts to attract foreign investment.
An excessive system of incentives and regulations may reduce the ben-
efit derived from the investment for the host country without significantly
increasing flow. Fiscal incentives are not a substitute for the fundamental
prerequisite of a good stable economic and political climate and appro-
priate financial and exchange rate policies. A good example is that of
several African countries where, despite the existence of elaborate in-
vestment codes offering substantial incentives, limited success in attract-
ing significant increases in foreign investment has been achieved, not only
due to small markets and limited natural resources but especially due to
unstable political and economic environments.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 14.
29. GUISINGER, supra note 23.
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B. INFRASTRUCTURAL ASPECT
The infrastructural aspect of the investment climate affects the attrac-
tion of the host country as an investment location. In its broad sense the
infrastructural aspect has many components, including in particular the
availability and efficiency of physical facilities and human resources.
The physical component comprises the existence of a basic transpor-
tation network (rail, road, harbor, and airport facilities), power, water
supply and sewerage systems, telecommunication systems, housing ar-
rangements, and a natural resource base. Industrial estates and free trade
zones can be an added attraction.
The availability of highly developed human resources may be a powerful
incentive for investment, especially in the manufacturing and service sec-
tors, which often require access to skilled labor and technical and man-
agerial personnel. This presupposes a certain educational infrastructure
and facilities for vocational training. If these resources are not available
locally, the freedom to employ needed foreign nationals is necessary. The
degree of discipline in the labor/management relationships in the host
country may also prove to be an important factor, especially in industrial
and labor-intensive investments.
Other elements of the infrastructural aspect of the investment climate
include the availability of marketing arrangements (distribution, ware-
housing, trading channels), technological elements (standards, quality
control and testing, laboratories, technology information system), and
supporting services (accounting/auditing, consulting/engineering, main-
tenance), 30 which will vary in degrees of sophistication depending upon
the level of economic development of the host country. Foreign investors
are bound to obtain such services through more costly means when they
are not readily available.
The institutional framework required for foreign portfolio investment
is particularly lacking in many developing countries. Restrictions on port-
folio investment as well as complex administrative arrangements, inad-
equate reporting requirements, and the narrowness of securities markets,
are the main problems. 31 On the part of the investor, lack of knowledge
30. See BANK GROUP ROLE, supra note 21.
31. See FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT, supra note 13, at 22. The IFC paper lists the
following barriers that developing countries impose on portfolio investment:
" prohibition of foreigners/non-residents purchasing domestic securities except as direct
investors;
• foreign exchange restrictions relating to foreign portfolio investment, particularly on
terms for repatriations;
" unduly high withholding taxes on individual income and capital gains, relative to either
or both international norms and treatment given domestic investors;
" minimum and discriminatory time periods during which foreign portfolio money must
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about the securities markets of developing countries, and perceptions
about risk have been deterrents. Given a change in the policies and the
implementation of appropriate modifications to the institutional frame-
work, as well as the perceptions of investors, portfolio investment can
be significantly increased in some developing countries.
In short, it is obvious that an adequate infrastructure is indispensable
for the implementation of an investment. In the absence of such an in-
frastructure, investors may be deterred altogether from undertaking in-
vestment because investment costs are increased and returns reduced. In
the event that the investment is undertaken under such circumstances, it
will be at an increased cost to the investor and, in turn, to the host country.
C. LEGAL ASPECTS
The third category of factors influencing the domestic investment cli-
mate is of a legal nature. There are basically two sets of legal factors: (I)
the substantive rules governing foreign investment, whether these are
domestic rules (e.g., investment codes, labor laws, tax regulations, etc.)
or international agreements (bilateral or multilateral investment treaties);
and (2) the procedure to be followed in the settlement of potential disputes
between foreign investors and their host government. The latter may be
limited to local remedies or may include resort to international mecha-
nisms for conflict resolution on an ad hoc basis or through institutional
conciliation or arbitration arrangements such as those available under the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration or the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Many developing countries have adopted codes favorable to foreign
investors 32 and concluded bilateral investment agreements with capital-
exporting countries providing for the protection of investments. 33 Al-
though such codes and treaties may in many cases be unclear, and their
application unpredictable, their mere existence is a relevant element in
signaling the government's desire for a stable investment environment
remain invested;
restrictions on the types of shares which can be purchased or held by foreign portfolio
investors either by class of share or by business sectors; and
complex regulatory procedures concerning registration and transfer of securities, div-
idend payments, and the mechanics of fund transfers.
Id.: see also OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 33, supra note 2, at 16.
32. For a collection of such laws, see I-X INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD (1973) (looseleaf service).
33. At present, some two hundred of such treaties are in force. For a collection of such
treaties, see I-Il INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
INVESTMENT TREATIES, (1984) (looseleaf service).
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and enhances investor's confidence. 34 More important, however, is the
actual behavior of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
host country. Frequent changes in legislation, breaches of contractual
arrangements, and the unavailability of a credible and independent judicial
system represent important shortcomings in the legal aspects of the in-
vestment climate for local and foreign investors alike, which cannot be
rectified merely by the issuance of a new favorable investment code. In
fact, the countries that manage best to attract foreign investment do not
offer any particular legal treatment to foreign investment, but simply treat
investment as a whole, both domestic and foreign, in a reasonable way
that encourages entrepreneurship and competition, assures stability, and
avoids excessive regulation and taxation. 35
Iii. Political Risk Perceptions
It is clear, therefore, that if foreign direct investment is to play a key
role in accelerating economic growth and development, policies have to
be adopted at both the international and domestic levels to encourage
larger volumes of such investment and to allow it to flow to regions of
the world where it can effectively contribute to the development process.
There is no grand theory that neatly explains all the determinants of
the decision to invest abroad. An investment decision is usually made on
the basis of the complex interaction of several factors: economic, finan-
cial, commercial and noncommercial, including psychological factors,
which are all of varying degrees of importance, depending, inter alia,
upon the objectives of the investor, the host and home countries in ques-
tion, and the sector and the project in which the investment will take
place.
First come the motivations and the factors affecting the behavior of the
investor who risks his time and capital. The investor's primary interest
is in identifying an investment opportunity that presents an adequate rate
of return relative to the perceived risk. Within this framework, other
corporate considerations may also play a role in making an investment,
such as the concern to secure or retain foreign markets, gain access to
raw materials, take advantage of low production costs, or forestall or
match a competitive move. The investor is highly selective and theoret-
ically has a worldwide choice in searching for the ideal location. However,
when choosing a location for investment, although many developing coun-
34. WORKING PAPERS No. 669, supra note 22, at 7.
35. For example, Singapore accounted for 38.8 percent of total foreign investment in Asia
in the period 1980-83. See BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS 1984, supra note 17; Oh,
The Pacific Basin: The View from Singapore, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ch. 5 (1986).
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tries may offer comparative advantages provided by market size, location,
and natural and human resources, a commercially less profitable invest-
ment in the home country or in another familiar industrialized or semi-
industrialized country may be preferable, due to the cost attached to
operating in alien environments, especially for smaller and less experi-
enced investors.
Studies indicate that perceptions of political risk can discourage the
flow of foreign investments. 36 The political risk factor may be evaluated
at different stages of the decision-making process. For example, investors
may screen out some host countries as too risky at the preliminary stage
of the decision-making process, thus preventing the identification of in-
vestment opportunities in these countries.
Aside from political and economic stability, a favorable government
attitude toward foreign investment, in the context of a sound and se-
riously implemented national development program, is also considered
to be an important variable. Investors are particularly affected by such
questions as the terms for the transfer of profits and the repatriation
of capital, nondiscrimination against foreign ownership and control, and
freedom from burdensome regulations on ownership and management. 37
When volatile conditions prevail, direct investments, which are long-
term by nature and comprise assets susceptible to physical attack,
become particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of instability and
may become the target of arbitrary and unpredictable behavior.
There are quantitative and qualitative costs attached to perceptions
of instability in developing countries. 38 Quantitatively, if the risk profile
is perceived to be too high, the projected investment would not be
made, thus decreasing the overall volume of capital inflows into the
host country. In fact, there may even be capital flight, as local investors
may prefer under the circumstances to invest in the industrialized econ-
omies even though they are aware of higher profits at home. In this
situation the competitive market for foreign investment will be reduced,
as much of the foreign investment will emanate primarily from larger
36. For summary of survey and cross-section studies on political instability as a variable
influencing the flow of foreign investment, see Agarwal, Determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment: A Survey, 116 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV. (REVIEW OF WORLD Eco-
NOMICS) 760-61 (1980). See generally Y. AHARONI. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION
PROCESS (1966).
37. See H. ROBINSON, THE MOTIVATION AND FLOW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(1961) (survey of two-hundred five companies covering three-hundred sixty-five investments
made in sixty-seven countries carried out in 1961 to determine what foreign investors define
as a desirable investment climate and the importance of specific factors influencing decisions
to invest). The report also offers findings on the view of twenty governments that evaluated
the incentives offered to foreign investors.
38. See Voss. Investment Protection and Promotion, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 691 (1982).
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investors who, unlike most small- and medium-sized companies, have
recourse to methods of self-insurance and have a greater capacity to
diversify their risks and protect their investment by other means. In-
vestments will also be carried out at a higher cost, to the detriment of
the host country, for a premium will be charged for the added risks,
and anticipated returns will have to be much higher to compensate for
such risks. Qualitatively, the type of investment made may be affected
because uncertainty about the medium and long-term horizon may en-
courage investors to go into ventures that yield high rates of return
over a short period, whereas many important investment opportunities
in these countries have longer gestation periods. Furthermore, by at-
tracting only large investors, host countries would not be able to take
advantage of the fact that smaller companies are often content with
more balanced contractual arrangements and better able to offer ap-
propriate technology suited to the needs of these countries. 39
It cannot be assumed, however, that large companies weather political
uncertainties better than smaller ones in all cases. Certain industries tend
to be more susceptible to noncommercial risks than others. For instance,
large mining and energy companies in the extractive industries which by
their nature require large capital investments, long gestation periods, and
are physically tied to a given location, have proved to be particularly
vulnerable to political risks. They have operated in developing countries
only when the risk-adjusted returns were still high enough to justify the
venture.
In the early 1970s, in the exercise of sovereignty over their natural
resources, many developing countries sought to play a greater role in the
exploitation and processing of their raw materials through nationalization
of foreign assets and similar measures. These developments greatly height-
ened foreign investors' perceptions of political risks. Together with lower
commodity prices, perceptions of such risks have adversely affected the
propensity to operate in the developing world as a whole. For example,
in the mining industry, despite the existence of rich and extensive mineral
deposits in parts of Africa, the tendency has been to concentrate on
deposits in "safe" industrialized countries like the United States, Canada,
Australia, and South Africa. 40 Similarly, in the energy industry, a recent
study,41 which included interviews with one hundred ninety executives
in forty energy companies in the U.S., Europe and Japan, found that
concerns about political risks and past experiences with expropriation,
39. Id.
40. Id. at 693-95.
41. WORLD BANK, ENERGY PROTECT GENERATION IN LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(report prepared by Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc. 1985).
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instability of contracts and politicization of energy development, have
greatly contributed to energy companies' caution about investing in de-
veloping countries. The study reveals, however, that energy companies
recognize that the developing countries remain an important element in
worldwide strategy, both as a critical resource base and as an essential
market in the long run. While the private sector is apparently willing to
invest on a significantly increased scale, the report concludes that it would
not do so unless there was a real change in both the perception and reality
of noncommercial risks faced in these countries. Most companies covered
in the study agreed that a globally operating investment guarantee scheme,
if combined with World Bank guarantees in certain cases, and perhaps
national and commercial political risk insurance, would greatly assist the
private sector in developed economies to invest in developing countries'
energy projects.
The current low rate of investment in the mining and energy sectors is
a trend that has to be viewed with particular concern. Although it is usually
justified by the present prices of the commodities concerned, it does not
seem to pay adequate attention to future scarcities that need to be ad-
dressed much earlier in these long gestation industries. Increased invest-
ment in these sectors is obviously required to ensure the future supply
needs of a growing world economy, At the same time, increased volumes
of investment would stimulate much needed economic growth in many
developing countries that, though rich in resources, are currently expe-
riencing severe economic problems. The mining and energy sectors pro-
vide good examples of how political risk can deter foreign investment and
why it is imperative to decrease the noncommercial risks involved and
thus provide investors with incentives for increasing capital flows into
the developing countries.
Political risk perceptions can, nevertheless, be diminished through con-
certed efforts at both the national and multilateral levels. As already
mentioned, interested host countries can certainly pursue policies that
are conducive to a more attractive investment climate. Investors' home
countries can also adopt policies to encourage their nationals to invest in
developing countries. They should at least remove existing barriers faced
by such investors in their home countries and otherwise treat the products
generated by these investments in their markets as they treat their national
products. Such domestic action on both sides of the investment flows
should, however, be complemented by international efforts to stimulate
appropriate policies, alleviate noncommercial losses, and more generally
contribute to restoring the confidence of investors and establishing stable
investment conditions.
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IV. Relevance of a Global Agency for
Investment Insurance and Promotion
At the multilateral level, the creation of a new global agency to
improve the worldwide investment climate and in particular that of
developing countries represents a significant and timely initiative, all
the more so if it is to combine the offering of guarantees against
noncommercial risks with broader service and advisory functions. Such
an agency would not only be a symbol of the multilateral will of the
world community to increase foreign investment flows; it would also
be the world policy instrument to pursue this objective on a systematic
and continuous basis. By providing guarantees against noncommercial
risks in a more comprehensive and effective manner than is available
at present, such an agency would reduce a major impediment to in-
ternational investment. The agency's guarantee against such risks could
improve the investors' perceptions of the risk profile of a potential
project, and in turn, would inevitably lower the rate of return required
by an investor to undertake the investment (the hurdle rate). 42 If and
to the extent that an investor associates noncommercial risk with an
investment, he can therefore be expected to reduce his hurdle rate in
return for a guarantee diminishing this risk. As this premium would
reduce the return from the investment, additionality would ensue when-
ever the reduction in the hurdle rate exceeds the premium.
This is a significant contribution when one considers the options that
are typically available to the investor when faced with uncertainty of a
noncommercial nature. If the risk is very high, the investment will not
normally be made by a prudent investor. There will thus be cases when,
despite opportunities for a profitable investment, investors will be reluc-
tant to proceed. On the other hand, if it is decided to go ahead, and no
guarantee is available, in all likelihood the investor will attempt to reduce
his vulnerability to risks through a variety of risk management techniques
such as the shortening of payback periods, the withholding from the host
country of key techniques, the exclusion of host country nationals from
key positions in the management of the venture, and the sourcing of inputs
to local operations and the disposition of the output of local operations
elsewhere in the corporate system. 43 Obviously, such practices are not
42. Voss, supra note 38, at 686, 690-91 (1982). For empirical data on increases in hurdle
rates and other adjustments in response to political risk perceptions by U.S. multinational
enterprises, see Kelly. Foreign Investment Evaluation Practices of U.S. Multinational Com-
panies 94, table 25 (1980).
43. See Moran, International Political Risk Assessment. Corporate Planning. and Strat-
egies to Offset Political Risk, in MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK STRATEGIES
AND TECHNIQUES 158 (Ghadar, Kobrin & Moran eds. 1983).
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likely to be consistent with the best interests of the host country. Quite
often, they create adverse reaction in the country, which increases the
potential of political risks.
Available guarantees provided by national agencies and the private
market have their inherent limitations. Coverage of national agencies,
though substantial in amounts and effect, 44 fluctuates markedly from year
to year and is extended only to a small fraction of investment flows. This
is not due to a lack of demand as much as to the limits of these agencies'
programs. Gaps in the existing systems result in particular from eligibility
criteria related to their respective national mandates and objectives, con-
sequent restrictive underwriting practices, and the limited financial re-
sources of each agency. Many of these constraints are inherent in the
national approach to investment insurance. Within this approach, the risk
diversification potential is likely to be limited due to concentration on
preferred countries and sectors. Emphasis on the nationality of the inves-
tor and on the specific interests of the country of the insurance agency
in the particular project are also likely to be highlighted, and the appraisal
capacity of the agency may be quite modest. By aggregating investments
from many countries and by offering uniform protection regardless of
nationality and providing cover to the multilaterally financed investments
while pursuing only economic considerations in its decisions, a multilat-
eral agency could certainly have a more diversified and depoliticized pro-
tection that would complement the work of the various national agencies
operating at present. Its emphasis on the soundness of investments and
their developmental impact and its long-term cover would also differen-
tiate its role from that of private political risk insurance. In addition, a
global guarantee agency can, through reinsurance of and coinsurance with
existing agencies, both public and private, contribute to a broader and
more effective coverage. It could enable existing facilities to better le-
verage their resources through the additional protection provided by such
reinsurance and coinsurance.
The transfer of risk through guarantees of investment against noncom-
mercial risks is of particular benefit to the developing world. It facilitates
investments that may not have otherwise been made without the coverage,
and helps in ensuring that they will be made on terms mutually beneficial
to both the investor and the host country. The purpose of such guarantees
is not to make an inherently bad project good. Rather, it is to reduce, if
44. The nineteen national agencies members of the Berne Union had at the end of 1984
investment under cover totalling about $15 billion, of which more than $2 billion were
accepted for cover in 1984. Only three of these agencies, however, had a total accumulated
cover exceeding $170 million. The few agencies not members of the Berne Union run very
modest programs.
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not neutralize, the uncertainty factor by providing protection against un-
anticipated risks that, if they occur, would seriously endanger the project
and the investor. After all, it is impossible to have zero risk in any dynamic
situation. By taking coverage, the investor is given the confidence to make
an investment decision based on business considerations, instead of for-
going profitable opportunities due to perceptions of political risk.
In addition to its effects on foreign investors, a multilateral investment
guarantee agency can also play an important role in reversing the capital
flight phenomenon that had badly damaged the economies of many de-
veloping countries in recent years. By extending its coverage to funds
brought from abroad by nationals of a developing member country, the
agency would enable such nationals to consider again introducing new
investments in their home country where they enjoy obvious advantages.
To the extent that such coverage takes place only with the approval of
the host government and after ascertaining consistency with its laws,
adequate safeguards would be in place to protect the system against pos-
sible abuses.
The value of a multilateral investment guarantee agency goes far beyond
that of providing compensation for losses. The very existence of such an
agency can be seen as an act of goodwill and confidence-building, and in
this sense could contribute to improving the investment conditions. The
multilateral nature of the guarantees provided would be more acceptable
to host countries than national ones, which may often be politically ori-
ented, in reality or perception. As has been observed, "by de-emphasizing
the national origin of the investment and its guarantee, discriminatory
action on the part of the host country may be discouraged, and the set-
tlement of disputes facilitated." The involvement of the agency will ob-
viously reduce possibilities of arbitrary action on the part of the host
country, sometimes preventing the loss from occurring at all and, in the
event that it should occur, mitigating the extent of the loss.
The fact that insurance is available for a specific country from an in-
ternational agency of which this country is a member enhances the con-
fidence of the investor and contributes to a positive impression about the
host country's receptiveness to foreign investment. In some cases, this
may lead to indirect additionality by encouraging other investors who may
choose to enter the market without a guarantee. Also, coverage of some
investment improves the overall risk portfolio of the investor, allowing
him to invest more capital in the developing countries (possibly other than
the hosts of the guaranteed investment). And a guaranteed investment
may attract additional investments of suppliers and customers. 45
45. For a detailed analysis of political risk considerations in the investment decision-
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"Qualitative additionality" is also expected to ensue from the involve-
ment of the guarantee agency. Improvements in the terms and conditions
of investments can occur, for example, when investments are made for
longer periods of time or with greater benefits to the host country with
respect to such elements as employment and the transfer of technology.
It may also ensue from the changes in the mix of foreign investors: if a
guarantee plays a larger role for small and medium-sized investors than
for large transnational corporations, host countries might be able to gain
more technology adapted to their needs and more labor-intensive invest-
ments, since these are more likely to be associated with small and medium-
sized investments. 46
Finally, the other major function of that agency, its promotional and
advisory services, can make a considerable contribution to the investment
climate. Much of the uncertainty about the political and economic envi-
ronment is due to lack of knowledge. A global specialized agency in this
field will offer a badly needed service that provides detailed, up-to-date,
and reliable information about the host country, its institutions, law, policy
framework, and sectors, and will attempt to identify potentially suitable
projects. Technical assistance may be provided to interested host coun-
tries as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of their investment
promotion programs, including direct assistance to them in brokering
particular investment opportunities. Above all, sound advise to interested
governments on the ways and means of attracting investments needed for
their development could best be offered by an international agency with
a worldwide experience and no particular national strategic or commercial
interest in mind.
As part of its complementary activities, the international agency, by
virtue of its composition and broad mandate, could also encourage and
facilitate the conclusion of agreement among its members on the pro-
motion and protection of foreign investments. It may also serve as a
multilateral forum for professional assessments and reports on the con-
sequences of certain policies, programs, and regulations affecting foreign
investments that have been adopted by industrialized or developing coun-
tries. Gradually, this agency should play a positive role in the establish-
ment of widely respected standards for the treatment of foreign investment
and more generally in the progressive development of international law
making process, see ARTHUR YOUNG & Co., A STUDY OF ADDITIONALITY OF OPIC As-
SISTANCE TO U.S. PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1982).
46. Study commissioned by the Bankmark Gersowitz and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Design of
a Multilateral Investment Insurance Agency: Additionality and Related Questions (1983)
(attached to IBRD, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE AGENCY-STAFF STUDIES)
(limited circulation 1983).
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in this important area of international relations where controversy abounds
about the content of applicable rules.
V. Conclusion
In a world that consists of strikingly different, yet increasingly inter-
dependent, political units, the movement of capital and technology across
national boundaries is virtually inevitable. Such a movement is subject,
however, to basic uncertainties that add to its vulnerability. Major among
these are the vagaries of the world economy, which for the most part are
outside the control of developing countries, and the politico-economic
environments of the host countries, especially those in the developing
world. These constraints hamper a more efficient global application of
investment resources and complicate the resolution of both the impending
debt crisis and the longer-term development problems of many countries.
It would be most unfortunate, therefore, if such constraints continued to
prevail. Concerted international efforts are needed in order to ensure
greater continuity, to increase the volume, to improve the quality, and to
reduce both the volatility and the social cost of foreign investment.
The recent decline in the overall volume of investment flows to devel-
oping countries and the large capital outflows from them have been the
natural result of a combination of factors. Following the debt overhang
of many such countries, recession arrested the growth of local markets
and reduced demand for new investment for import substitution purposes.
The sharp drop in the prices of primary commodities, including oil, has
adversely affected investment in the extractive sector. Most export-oriented
industries were also affected by increasing protectionism in industrial
countries. In addition to such factors, more enduring forces have been at
work to the detriment of the poorer countries. The continuing decline in
the share of labor in the total cost of production resulting from increased
shifts to automated and technology-based industries is reducing the com-
parative advantage of developing countries with lower labor costs. In-
creased cost of production in these countries resulting in particular from
persistent high rates of inflation and a low level of technical education is
also making them less attractive to investors seeking cheaper locations
for their export-oriented products. For a while (1982-1985) the strength
of the U.S. economy with its strong dollar, unprecedented high interest
rates, and favorable outlook for output, profits, and inflation offered an
attractive alternative to conservative investors. Last, but not least, per-
ceptions of high and increasing political risks in developing countries,
especially risks related to the convertibility and transfer of profits, have
greatly discouraged investors from transferring new funds or even rein-
vesting the earnings of existing enterprises. In several Latin American
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countries, flows became negative and some multinationals started to di-
vest out of the region.
New policy initiatives to arrest these trends are therefore required if
there is to be a reversal of the perverse direction in which funds now
flow, from poor to rich countries. Among the factors that could cause
larger flows of investment to developing nations, improvement of the
investment climate and reduction of perceptions related to political risks
are fundamental prerequisites. In this context, the creation of the Mul-
tilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) comes as a major policy
initiative that has considerable potential to remove barriers to interna-
tional investment and give a new vigor to the development process.
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